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What kind of evolutionary biology 
suits cultural research?
Kalevi Kull1
Michel Foucault (1971[1966]) demonstrated remarkable parallelism and mutual 
infl uences between biology, linguistics and economics. Th e parallelism can be con-
sidered obvious, when taking into account that all three fi elds of research in principle 
study semiotic systems; together with humanities in general, they are areas of semiotic 
research, not physical sciences. However, the extent to which theories and models 
used in these fi elds are based on a semiotic approach varies. For instance, a model of 
evolutionary change may or may not take into account the processes of interpretation 
and meaning-making.
Th ere is more than one version of the theory of evolution. Besides the neo-
Darwinian version (the “standard theory”, developed since the 1930s on the basis of 
the Modern Synthesis), there are others, among which at least one (the epigenetic 
theory, also called “Extended Synthesis”) is close to semiotic biology. It is particularly 
important to pay attention to this when applying biological models in cultural 
research, for the choice of initial assumptions in which the models of evolution diff er 
may result in remarkable diff erences in conclusions. 
Th e existence of alternative theories has been characteristic of the whole history 
of the study of evolution. What makes the contemporary period remarkable, in this 
context, is the epigenetic and semiotic turn in evolutionary theory. Th at this turn 
or shift  has already largely happened could be observed at the recent conference 
“New trends in evolutionary biology: Biological, philosophical and social science 
perspectives”, held in London during 7–9 November 2016, and organized jointly by 
the Royal Society and the British Academy. Below I shall give an overview of this 
meeting, but some more words about the preliminaries and context are also pertinent.
It is not usual for these two institutions to organize events together, as the Royal 
Society specializes in natural sciences, and the British Academy is concerned with 
social sciences and humanities. However, if the discrimination ‘semiotic versus 
physical’ points at a deeper divide than ‘human versus natural’ (or ‘culture versus 
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nature’), the collaboration between (semiotic) biology, social sciences and humanities 
is genuine for these are sciences that study meaning-making.2 
Th e meeting in London was intended to discuss the contemporary change in the 
theory of evolution – the replacement of the standard theory (also called Modern 
Synthesis, neo-Darwinism, etc.) by a more relevant (and also more fundamental) one, 
that is variably called the Extended Synthesis or post-Darwinism, yet can also be called 
a semiotic theory of evolution. 
To put it briefl y, this contemporary approach can show, “why genes are usually 
followers, not leaders, in evolutionary change” (West-Eberhard 2003: 29). Th e core of 
this turn can be described as follows.
Th e basis of the standard theory was formulated by Charles Darwin, later it became 
somewhat more limited as connected to genetics by neo-Darwinians, and updated 
and mathematized as the Modern Synthesis during several decades since the 1930s. 
It claims that evolutionary innovation is caused by random changes in the genome, 
followed by diff erential reproductive “success”. Th is means that an evolutionary 
change begins from stochastic changes in genetic memory that create diversity, and is 
aft erwards tested by diff erential reproduction of genetically diff erent variants (which 
is, by defi nition, natural selection). In this case, the “meaningfulness” of any forms 
and changes exclusively relies upon the fact of survival, or fi tness. Moreover, speaking 
about the meaning of the changes will always stay metaphorical or illusionary for a 
neo-Darwinian approach. 
According to the alternative mechanism, the evolutionary change would begin 
with the organisms’ new responses or new solutions to the problems they face (a new 
choice between options), using their resource of plasticity; this meaningful plastic 
change may become stabilized by soft  (epigenetic or ecological) inheritance. If the 
stabilization lasts long enough, random changes in the genome (especially due to 
recombination, but not only) may lead to hard inheritance of the change. Since a 
plastic change of an organism’s processes can be meaningful in the fi rst place (because 
it is carried out by a perception–action cycle – called a ‘functional circle’ by Jakob von 
Uexküll), this mechanism can be called a semiotic one.
Both these mechanisms describe adaptive changes, yet in addition many non-
adaptive changes exist in evolution – the well-studied genetic drift , as well as 
meaningless plastic changes (those that arise without the involvement of a choice 
between options) that may become hereditary. 
Th e way towards the contemporary change in the theory of evolution has been 
paved by earlier developments in the study of life, knowledge of which can help to 
understand the turn.
2 See also Cobley 2016.
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Theoretical biology
Th eoretical biology with its more-than-a-century-long history has been developing 
a view that largely includes most of the statements that are now overthrowing the 
strictly Darwinian view. Notably, the whole fi eld of theoretical biology as known under 
this name started with monographs by Johannes Reinke and Jakob von Uexküll that 
were very critical of the Darwinian account of life processes. Later, the Th eoretical 
Biology Club in London in the 1930s (see, e.g., Niemann 2014; Peterson 2017) and 
Waddington’s Symposia “Towards a Th eoretical Biology” in 1966–1970 developed an 
approach that was largely structuralist.3 Much the same tradition, together with a view 
critical of neo-Darwinism, has been followed by the annual Estonian Spring Schools 
in Th eoretical Biology conducted since the 1970s, as well as the series of symposia 
organized by the Konrad Lorenz Institute in Altenberg, Austria, and their book series.4 
An Altenberg symposium held in 2008 was even thought to have become something 
like the Woodstock of Evolution (Whitfi eld 2008).
For a better understanding of the structure of biological thought, it could be 
instructive to characterize some of it via the opposition between structuralism and 
functionalism. For instance, Elliot Murphy writes:
Whereas many have characterised the central debate in nineteenth-century biology 
as being between evolutionists and creationists, a more accurate classifi cation (as 
Darwin himself noted) would distinguish teleologists5 (who regarded adaptation 
[as] the single most important aspect in evolution) with morphologists (who held 
that commonalities of structure were the defi ning biological characteristic) – 
a dichotomy stressed by E. S. Russell’s Form and Function. Th e formalists (or, 
following Chomsky’s terminology, ‘internalists’) include such fi gures as D’Arcy 
Th ompson, Brian Goodwin, Richard Owen, Stuart Kauff man, Geoff roy St. Hilaire, 
Richard Goldschmidt, Nikolai Severtzov, Louis Agassiz, Karl Ernst von Baer and 
Goethe (whose plant studies lead him to coin the term ‘rational morphology’). 
Th ey focused on form and structural commonalities as their explana[n]dum, 
leaving aside the question of adaptive eff ects as a secondary concern. (Murphy 
2012: 49–50)
3 See also an overview of two of these symposia by Waddington (1968). 
4 My own fi rst encounter with the non-Darwinian views occurred at a Th eoretical Biology 
Winter School in Borok, Russia in 1976, where Sergei Meyen and his colleagues expressed their 
support to the nomogenetic theory of Lev Berg and Aleksandr Lyubischev. What decisively 
changed my understanding of evolution was a result in mathematical modelling of the eff ects 
of biparental reproduction on variability that proved the communicative origin of species (I 
published it in Estonian in Schola Biotheoretica in 1985).
5 It can be noticed that the terminology seems to be confusing – usually, it is Baer who has 
been considered to be a teleologist, and not Darwin. It depends on how we position adaptation 
(and learning).
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Th is is the same opposition between functionalism and structuralism to which Stephen 
Jay Gould devoted his opus magnum, Th e Structure of Evolutionary Th eory, using it as 
his main thread of argument (Gould 2002). 
Accordingly, described as neither neo-Darwinian (selectionist) evolutionism 
(functionalism, in Gouldian terms) nor creationism, there is a third way of formalism, 
or structuralism, or internalism (as these concepts were treated in the quotation above 
from Murphy). Indeed, the scholars listed by Murphy (in a rather haphazard manner) 
are those more oft en referred to in writings representing the third way than in the 
Modern Synthesis ones.
Moreover, formalism, structuralism, and internalism are the approaches on which 
the 20th-century semiotics was based to a large degree. Th us the third way hints 
directly towards biosemiotics even if not using the term. And more than that: post-
structuralist and cognitive approaches in semiotics go hand in hand with analogous 
trends in the evolutionary (epigenetic) thought of the late 20th century. 
Yet there is more than that: since semiotics is not just about structure, but is 
fundamentally about meaning or function, the third way is another approach to 
functionality, and to the phenomenon of adaptation. Th e functionalism/structuralism 
opposition is not suffi  cient to describe the situation, while the new approach provides 
a non-Darwinian model of adaptation. 
Instead of a lengthy description of the predecessors of the current change, for 
instance a survey of the role of Karl Ernst von Baer, James Mark Baldwin, Lynn 
Margulis, and others, let me point out two more recent events paving the way for the 
Royal Society meeting in 2016. 
2011 meeting at the Linnean Society
One of these was a meeting organized by the British entomologist Richard Vane-
Wright fi ve years earlier, almost at the same location and with the same aims. It took 
place on 8 September 2011 at the Linnean Society of London – remarkably in the same 
location on Piccadilly where the articles by Charles Darwin and Alfred Russel Wallace 
caused a turn in evolutionary biology in 1858.
Th e 2011 conference was titled “Th e role of behaviour in evolution – ‘organisms can 
be proud to have been their own designers’”6. Th e speakers were Peter Corning, Denis 
Walsh, John Dupré, Patrick Bateson, Anne Magurran, Gregory Grether, Birgit Arnholdt-
Schmitt, and Kalevi Kull; the audience included Peter Saunders, the late Mae-Wan Ho, 
and Robin Bruce. By no means a large event, it certainly was an infl uential step towards 
the conference held in nearby Carlton House Terrace fi ve years later. 
6 Th e subtitle was a reference to Kull 2000. Vane-Wright used it as a motto already in an 
earlier paper (Vane-Wright 2009). See also Vane-Wright 2011.
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Moreover, the 2011 meeting resulted in a special issue of Biological Journal of the 
Linnean Society (Volume 112, Issue 2, 2014) titled “Th e role of behaviour in evolution”. 
Th e contributors were R. I. Vane-Wright, Peter A. Corning, Massimo Pigliucci, Patrick 
Bateson, Gregory F. Grether, Kalevi Kull, Denis M. Walsh, John Dupré, Adrian M. Lister, 
Andrew Packard with Jonathan T. Delafi eld-Butt, and Robin W. Bruce. As it includes 
works that describe the role of agency and further details of a non-Darwinian mechanism 
of adaptation (incl. Bateson 2014; Kull 2014; etc.), it has a direct bearing on the turn in 
evolutionary biology. 
The third way of evolution
Evolutionary biology is a fi eld heavily intertwined with ideology (see, e.g., Kolchinskij 
2014). For instance, Darwinism of the early 20th century was oft en related to the 
eugenics movement; the vulgar Darwinism of Trofi m Lysenko was supported by Soviet 
Communist ideology in the 1940s-50s, as was the Synthetic Th eory of Evolution in 
the following decades; neo-Darwinism is supportive of and supported by neoliberal 
ideology; etc. Th is makes eff ecting the turn considerably more diffi  cult. Obviously, it 
cannot be brought along by a single scientist, or by a single event. However, a whole 
series of discussions may make it happen. 
Th e logical precision and completeness of the description of mechanisms dis-
covered is certainly important. However, the terminology is oft en so imprecise – parti-
cularly as to the most general concepts especially in focus as concerns the change – 
that it is hard to formulate the necessary distinctions in an unambiguous way. For 
instance, even the term ‘natural selection’ – despite its mathematically clear defi nition 
in many works on population genetics – is defi ned very loosely (and variably) by most 
biologists.
In 2014, a group of scholars supporting the idea of the third way of evolution was 
formed. Th is project was launched by James Shapiro, Raju Pookottil (creator of the 
website) and Denis Noble, the last-named being the present leader of the group, 
whose reformulation of metaphors for general biology (Noble 2006; 2013) has been 
remarkably infl uential. Th e group is presented by an internet portal7 that briefl y 
introduces the work of scholars (currently 60 in number) that has been instructive for 
rearranging the theory of evolution, or replacing the neo-Darwinian theory. Th us, the 
change is becoming truly collective: no earlier single attempt has been able to establish 
it, so the collective eff ort appears to be the only way to go in this situation.
Th e sharpness of the contrast can be seen, for instance, in a pair of articles 
presenting the opposing views quite recently published in Nature (Laland et al. 2014; 
Wray et al. 2014). A set of interviews with some members of the third way of evolution 
(Mazur 2015) provides an insight into some aspects of the paradigm shift . 
7 See http://www.thethirdwayofevolution.com/.
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The meeting itself: Royal Society, London, November 2016
Th e three-day conference “New trends in evolutionary biology: Biological, philo-
sophical and social science perspectives” took place at the Royal Society of London, 
with close to 300 attendees. Th is ‘Scientifi c Discussion Meeting’ was organized by 
Denis Noble, Nancy Cartwright, Patrick Bateson, John Dupré and Kevin Laland in 
collaboration with the British Academy.
Th ere was a balanced overlap with speakers of the former meetings that paved the 
way for this one: there were Gerd Müller and Eva Jablonka from Altenberg 2008, while 
Patrick Bateson and John Dupré had been presenters at the 2011 Linnean Society 
meeting. From the members of the Th ird Way of Evolution interviewed in the book 
by Mazur (2015) the programme included Denis Noble and James Shapiro. 
Th e preparation period for the meeting had lasted over two years, and as the 
organizers confessed, the programme had to be modifi ed even aft er acceptance by the 
host organizations, largely because of the reluctance by some neo-Darwinist biologists 
to take part.8 However, the fi nal programme included supporters of rather opposing 
views, which benefi tted the resulting discussions, I fi nd. Th e following provides a few 
brief notes made on spot about the talks, in the order they were given.
Day 1. In his welcome speech, Denis Noble reemphasized the importance of the fact 
of the British Academy and the Royal Society being the event’s joint organizers – 
which is in itself rare – and called for discussions between the humanities and natural 
sciences on evolutionary biology which is a very vigorous fi eld of science. He also 
mentioned that the organizers had been trying to balance the programme of the 
meeting since the outset. 
Th e programme was opened by Gerd Mü ller’s programmatic lecture “Th e extended 
evolutionary synthesis”. Müller started with pointing out how the defi nition of 
evolution has changed: for Darwin it was ‘descent with modifi cation’, for population 
geneticists ‘change of gene frequencies in populations’; evolution has also been defi ned 
as ‘species diversifi cation’, or as ‘generation of organismal complexity’ (evo-devo, 
systems biology, behavioural biology), or as the origin of mind, language, society, 
culture (anthropology, linguistics, social sciences).
According to Müller’s claim, the Modern Synthesis (seeing natural selection as 
the only directional factor in evolution) can explain genetic variation in evolving 
populations very well. What the Modern Synthesis does not explain, however, is 
phenotypic complexity, the origin of body plans, phenotypic novelty, non-gradual 
forms of transition, non-genetic factors of change. He also pointed out that the 
microevolution–macroevolution distinction obscures the issues that emerge from the 
current challenges to the standard theory. 
8 Some of these discussions are described in Mazur 2016.
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By describing a number of challenges for evolutionary biology of the past two 
decades, Müller provided an integrative view, for which he used the niche construction 
scheme of Odling-Smee, but adding more recursivity to it.
Müller claimed that a more complex and more pluralistic picture that we have 
reached now – the Extended Synthesis – is based on new evidence from multiple 
fi elds; it integrates them and has a heuristic value; it has its own predictions that are 
diff erent from the Modern Synthesis framework (see also Pigliucci, Müller 2010; 
Laland et al. 2015).
Douglas Futuyma in his lecture “Th e evolutionary synthesis today: Extend 
or amend?” responded to the position outlined by Müller, stating that most of the 
phenomena Müller described have been known already for a long time and have been 
integrated by the contemporary Modern Synthesis. He further demonstrated how 
several of these phenomena (including niche construction, plasticity, the Baldwin 
eff ect, restricted phenotypic variability, constraints on developmental directions, 
etc.) can be explained by the standard theory, according to which an improbable new 
thing begins with a single thing (change in a genome), and turns into a feature of a 
population via natural selection.
Sonia Sultan in her paper “Developmental plasticity: Re-conceiving the genotype” 
described experiments with Polygonum plants that showed trans-generational 
plasticity, pointing out how the genetic information accessible for natural selection is 
dependent on the environment. According to her, a theory of adaptation that would 
describe adaptation on the individual level is still missing.
Russell Lande (“Evolution of phenotypic plasticity”) spoke about correlated 
variation in the wild, showing how evolution of plasticity accelerates phenotypic 
evolution and adaptation. As he describes an evolutionary change, it begins with 
a rapid transient increase of plasticity, followed by slow genetic assimilation – all 
explainable on the basis of the assumptions of standard theory. At this conference, 
Lande, together with Futuyma, were the strongest supporters of the view that the 
basic assumptions of Modern Synthesis are capable of covering the explanations of 
phenomena related to learning and plasticity.
Tobias Uller (“Heredity and evolutionary theory”) described a strong self-
referentiality in the evolution of organisms. Th e standard theory does not demonstrate 
clearly enough that variability, selection, and heredity are all changing themselves. 
John Dupré (“Th e ontology of evolutionary process”) spoke about the importance 
of process ontology in biology, noting that life consists of processes rather than 
things. He recalled that the Th eoretical Biology Club of the 1930s (including Joseph 
H. Woodger) was strongly infl uenced by Alfred Whitehead’s process philosophy. Even 
genomes are not static, not to mention other systems of life. An organism should be 
viewed as a hierarchy of developmental processes which are stabilized, not by inertia, 
but by activity.
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Paul Brakefi eld (“Does the way in which development works bias the paths taken 
by evolution?”) analysed the phenomenon of developmental bias using the data on 
eyespot pattern evolution on butterfl y wings. He showed, for instance, that there exists 
fl exibility in size but not that much in colour of eyespots. Th us the way development 
works and the restrictions it poses can contribute to shaping evolution.
Kevin Laland had titled his presentation as “Th e middle ground between artifi cial 
and natural selection: Niche construction as developmental bias”. Aft er John Odling-
Smee, Laland is one of major proponents of the niche construction model. He sees 
niche construction as opposite and complementary to natural selection. He also 
contrasted the niche construction view with Richard Dawkins’ extended phenotype 
perspective. However, the niche construction model uses natural selection as a 
necessary component of the evolution mechanism (see Odling-Smee et al. 2003). 
To put it simply, organisms can strongly aff ect the selection pressure by the way in 
which their behaviours change their own environment. According to this model, 
the behavioural bias or the developmental bias and natural selection work together. 
Ecological inheritance plays an important role in this. An organisms’ decision-making 
is a factor that infl uences natural selection.9
Day 2 began (aft er a brief welcome note from Denis Noble) with a lecture by James 
Shapiro (“Biological action in Read-Write genome evolution”), in which he gave many 
examples of endosymbiosis, hybridization, horizontal DNA transfers, regulatory 
functions by non-coded RNAs etc., as examples of how living organisms regularly 
use generic activities to facilitate their own evolution. In particular, he noted that 
hybridization is a trigger for reorganization of the genome (see also Shapiro 2011). 
Paul Griffi  ths (“Genetic, epigenetic and exogenetic information in development 
and evolution”) described a new measure of biological information, formalizing the 
concept of information as specifi c diff erence making. He saw it as a generalization of 
Francis Crick’s conception of information, aiming to build a measure applicable both 
at the genetic and the epigenetic levels.
Eva Jablonka (“Th e role of epigenetic inheritance in evolution”) recalled Karl Popper’s 
strongly critical evaluation of Darwinism (see Niemann 2014). While Ernst Mayr (1980: 
17) has claimed that “soft  inheritance does not exist”,10 Popper, to the contrary, viewed 
organisms as active agents, making it possible for an evolutionary change to start from 
the phenotype, not from the genotype. Once again repeating Mary Jane West-Eberhard’s 
9 One can see a similarity between constracting a niche and constructing a scaff olding (as 
described, e.g., by Hoff meyer 2014). However, according to Laland, scaff olding is a special case 
of niche construction.
10 Th e whole sentence runs: “It was perhaps the greatest contribution of the young science 
of genetics to show that soft  inheritance does not exist” (Mayr 1980: 17; Mayr dedicated this 
article to Bernhard Rensch).
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maxim that genes are followers, not leaders,11 Jablonka also spoke about the role of 
what has been called adaptive improvization (Soen et al. 2015). She made the summary: 
“(1) Phenotype fi rst – the activity (phenotypic accommodation) of the organism is 
fundamental, and drives evolutionary processes. (2) Hereditary variation – there is 
more to heredity than genes. Evolution can occur on diff erent (interacting) axes. (3) 
Selection – there is more to selection than natural selection. (4) Natural selection is not 
the only process that can lead to cumulative evolutionary change”. Proceeding from this, 
she asked: “Together, does this mean that all we need is just a cosmetic change to the 
Modern Synthesis? What would count as a revision?”12 
Greg Hurst (“Extended genomes: Symbiosis and evolution”) introduced some 
interesting deviations from the standard model that stemmed from the role of 
symbiosis. He spoke about the holobiont as a level (and a unit) of selection and 
demonstrated how microbial variation can produce inter-individual phenotypic 
variation that aff ects survival and reproduction. “Symbiosis aff ords opportunity to 
develop otherwise unavailable phenotypes,” he said. 
In his lecture “Evolution viewed from medicine and physiology” Denis Noble described 
how organisms can and do harness stochasticity in order to generate functionality – 
providing explanations for these mechanisms. Due to this, the evolutionary process is 
directional, and this is a huge change, not a mere tinkering or minor change in Modern 
Synthesis. Th is, as he said, turns neo-Darwinism on its head. Th is is a major change that 
has implications in economics, political theory, and various other disciplines, philosophy 
included. As a consequence, the evolutionary equations that have been used for modelling 
evolution have to be revised. Noble also emphasized that conceptual change in biology is 
not based on one experiment, but on cumulative evidence. 
Andy Gardner in his talk (““Anthropomorphism” in evolutionary biology”) 
analysed a formulation common in neo-Darwinian biology that “organisms strive to 
maximize their fi tness”. He showed the similarity between the adaptation concepts of 
William Paley and of Darwinians. According to Gardner, Darwin’s theory, viewed on 
such an approximation, has an enormous predictive power for biology.
In his talk “Adaptability and evolution”, Patrick Bateson, aft er recalling the work 
of James Mark Baldwin (the Baldwin eff ect as an adaptability driver), Jean Piaget (his 
Behaviour and Evolution from 1979, also mentioned by Eva Jablonka), and Michael 
Conrad (adaptability is related to the uncertainty of the environment), spoke about 
the importance of play and playfulness in creativity and innovation. Play, as he said, 
enhances adaptability. Generalist species are more playful than specialist species. 
A round table discussion with Andy Gardner, Marcus Feldman, Tobias Uller and 
Douglas Futuyma closed the second day. In her introduction to the discussion, Nancy 
11 West-Eberhard 2003: 29 – see above, p. 635.
12 Th ese quotations derive from the slides used during the talk.
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Cartwright compared sciences as either testable operational (as Karl Popper put it), or 
research programmes (as characterized by Imre Lakatos). She admitted that Darwinian 
evolution was a viable research programme. Another distinction, when speaking 
about selection, concerns the problem whether there is viability selection or fertility 
selection. (Or – is there selection?) As to the main discussion point, Eva Jablonka asked 
Douglas Futuyma what he would consider a major extension and not just cosmetics of 
evolutionary theory. Futuyma responded that there was a comfortable assimilation of new 
ideas into the Modern Synthesis, but what would be really new would be a mechanism for 
adaptation that is not based on selection; that would be really surprising.13
Day 3 of the meeting saw more speakers from the fi eld of anthropology, with the 
particular theme of applying the concept of niche construction in the sphere of culture.
Samir Okasha (“Evolution and the metaphor of agency”) demonstrated how the 
metaphoric agential thinking that has become widespread in neo-Darwinian discourse 
is misleading and should be avoided, particularly as it inhibits the correct usage of the 
concept of agency in biology. Organisms, at least as far as they can make true choices, 
are agents. Th e speaker assumed that organisms have a single overall goal. However, 
in order to make a true choice, there is no need for a single overall goal; it is enough 
to have local simultaneous options.
Karola Stotz spoke in her presentation (“Developmental niche construction”) how 
the environment is also a creator of variation, and how species-typical knowledge is 
acquired via social networks, referring among others to Jean Piaget, Paul Weiss, and 
Scott Gilbert. Broadening historically the niche construction concept, she quoted West 
and King (1987: 552) who suggest asking “not what’s inside the genes you inherited, 
but what the genes you inherited are inside of ” (see also Oyama 2000).14 
Tim Lewens (“Human nature, human culture: Th e case of cultural evolution”) 
pointed out that the study of cultural evolution does not need the culture/nature 
distinction. Moreover, with reference to Christina Toren, the cultural/biological 
distinction is problematic. Th us, it can be claimed that social process is fundamental, 
whereas the type of culture is its product.
Agustí n Fuentes (“Human niche, human behaviour, human nature”) provided 
some archeological data that demonstrated a growth of violence in the course of 
cultural evolution, also pointing out during the discussion that semiotics is of vital 
importance in understanding the human niche. 
13 It is remarkable that it already exists – a model explaining the mechanism of adaptation 
without natural selection, while still assuming only random mutations (see Kull 2014; Hughes 
2012). 
14 It should also be noted that the concept of ‘developmental niche’ is very close to the semiotic 
niche as described, for instance, by Jesper Hoff meyer (2008).
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Andrew Whiten (“A second inheritance system: Th e extension of biology through 
culture”) spoke about the role of social learning and social inheritance, and gave many 
examples of it. 
Susan Antó n (“Human evolution, niche construction and plasticity”) asked how 
much the phenotype having been considered unimportant has infl uenced the study 
of human evolution.
Melinda Zeder (“Domestication: A model system for evolutionary biology”) 
spoke about evolvability in a human-engineered niche, and ecological inheritance. 
She pointed out how in case of domestication the changes in diff erent genes can be 
connected. 
In the fi nal round table discussion with Robert Foley, Christina Toren, Melinda 
Zeder, Tim Lewens and Eva Jablonka, some take-home messages were expressed. Foley 
explained why the modifi ed theory of evolution is more suitable for social sciences and 
humanities than the earlier one. Toren noted that, in addition to process ontology, also 
process epistemology is needed. Jablonka stressed that the fi rst question to be asked is 
how a social system is maintained across time; once this is understood, we could start 
to study how it is changing or how to change it. Jablonka also said: “Natural selection 
is only a special case of diff erential stabilization”, and, concerning methodology, 
she claimed that thick descriptions are important also in biology and ecology. Th e 
discussants found it was important to think how to make biologists interested in the 
work of the social sciences.
Concluding remarks
Agency, learning, niche construction, meaning-making – these are phenomena 
common to living beings. Anthropology and cultural evolution studies that deal with 
these phenomena can benefi t from biology that includes them. A turn towards this 
kind of biology was the aim of the meeting. 
Th e views of a scientist can change, and oft en do change, before there is enough 
evidence for a new view. For example, my view on mechanisms of evolution moved 
away from Modern Synthesis already in the late 1970s, as a result of taking seriously 
the work of Karl Ernst von Baer, Lev Berg and Sergei Meyen, and being infl uenced by 
the group of Conrad Waddington. However, the diffi  cult, hard problem for biology is to 
explain the origin, role, and reality of meaning.15 Only a theory that can deal with this 
can without losses suit anthropology and cultural sciences. Th e mechanism of evolution 
that is relevant to this has to be capable of explaining adaptation and functionality 
independently from natural selection. Here, the work of last decades is decisive. 
15 Th is is where biosemiotics enters – via Uexküll 1928, Hoff meyer 2014, Deacon 2011, and 
others (see also Favareau 2010; Emmeche 2002; Kull et al. 2009). 
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As it has been explained by several scholars, the non-selectionist adaptation-
making mechanism is based on the capacity of organisms to fi nd solutions in new 
situations and keep these if they met their needs. Organisms themselves do not 
test their behaviour against survivorship – they do it against the fulfi llment of their 
current needs, and this is usually enough to keep their line alive, maybe for millions 
of years. Random genetic processes build or transform stochastic constraints that 
are channeling behavioural possibilities and make the forms inheritable. Assortative 
mating, that is unavoidable in the case of biparentality, results in a certain inbreeding 
and reduction of intraspecies genetic variability. Strictly speaking, adaptation (and 
speciation) is possible without natural selection.
As has oft en been the case in recent decades, if only some aspects of the new view 
get described, its interpretation in the framework of Modern Synthesis will be presented 
soon. However, what really changes the theory of evolution is a model that demonstrates 
adaptation without natural selection. And, as was said above, this result already exists. 
Th us, functionalism and structuralism become integrated in the current turn, 
resulting in a semiotic biology that could best suit not only social sciences and 
humanities, but also biology itself. Th e neo-Darwinian theory will stay as a restricted 
special case of a much richer and deeper theory of evolution (see also Ingold, Palsson 
2013).
Denis Noble and his colleagues organized a meeting at the Royal Society that 
may prove to have been historic. Not because of any new results per se (the results as 
well as their new interpretations were published earlier) but for the collective shift  in 
viewpoint. It was not a scientifi c turn – that had already happened some years earlier. 
However, it was a social turn in evolutionary biology (irrespective of the fact that in 
the Society for the Study of Evolution, and in the European Society for Evolutionary 
Biology the turn still seems to be ahead) – the meeting in which, I suppose, the 
majority of the attendants felt it.16 For me, the scientifi c turn in evolutionary theory 
had happened already at the meeting of the Linnean Society in 2011, while the 
important scientifi c results themselves were on the table even earlier. 
Above all, for diff erent interpreters the science moves diff erently. Th ere are many 
evolutions in one evolution. Th e history of life – the history of semiotic systems – is 
plural, and everything that is meaningful is essentially plural.17 
16 See, e.g., an account of this meeting by Perry Marshall (Royal Society’s “New Trends in 
Biological Evolution” – a bloodless revolution; http://cosmicfi ngerprints.com/royal-society-
evolution/).
17 Acknowledgements. I thank Denis Noble, Richard Vane-Wright, Eva Jablonka, and IUT2-44.
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